Cleveland State Law Review
Volume 48
Issue 1 Symposium: Re-Orienting Law and
Sexuality
2000

Computer Searches and Seizure
Donald Resseguie

Follow this and additional works at: https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev
Part of the Fourth Amendment Commons

How does access to this work benefit you? Let us know!
Recommended Citation
Note, Computer Searches and Seizure, 48 Clev. St. L. Rev. 185 (2000)

This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at EngagedScholarship@CSU. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Cleveland State Law Review by an authorized editor of EngagedScholarship@CSU. For
more information, please contact library.es@csuohio.edu.

Note

COMPUTER SEARCHES AND SEIZURE
I. INTRODUCTION .................................................................... 185
II. CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS ON
SEARCHES AND SEIZURES .................................................... 186
III. THE PLAIN VIEW DOCTRINE ................................................ 190
IV. INFORMANTS ........................................................................ 198
V. SCOPE OF SEARCH AND SEIZURE AND
PARTICULARITY OF WARRANTS ........................................... 203
A. The Closed Container Analogy &
Particularity of Warrants ............................................ 203
B. The Problem of Intermingled Documents.................... 205
VI. THE SUBPOENA PROCESS ..................................................... 210
VII. CONCLUSION........................................................................ 212
I. INTRODUCTION
Computers have become a principal means for storing both personal and business
information for large numbers of people. In addition, with the increasing use of the
Internet and e-mail many people use computers as a means of accessing information
and communicating with others both in personal and business contexts. People
increasingly store and manipulate accounting and business records with computer
systems. At the same time, commercially available computerized accounting
software has dropped significantly in price and has become increasingly easy to use.
At one time, maintaining a detailed and accurate set of accounting records was
beyond the ability of all but well trained and experienced professionals. Today,
however, persons with little or no accounting or business background are able
competently to maintain their business and accounting records. The trend is one of
greater availability and constantly dropping prices. As this trend continues, we will
see an increased use of computers by all sectors of the population. Along with the
use of computerized record keeping and communication in legitimate enterprise has
come the use of the same technology by criminal enterprises in carrying out their
activities.
As a result of this trend, computer storage devices have increasingly become the
targets of government investigations of criminal activity. The government has used
evidence gathered from computers countless times in criminal prosecutions. The
methods by which government officials seek to gather evidence from computers
couple with the limits placed on the state by the United States Constitution, and the
courts raise critical issues of personal privacy for all citizens who use computers in
their daily lives.
This note will discuss legal issues related to search and seizure of computers and
define the trend that the law is taking in the emerging area of inquiry. Personal
privacy protection will be adequate regarding computer searches and seizures only if
the courts properly balance the government’s interests in bringing criminals to justice
against citizens’ interests against overly broad inquiries into the personal affairs.
The government’s interest cannot be placed so high that all areas of one’s personal
life becomes the subject of governmental scrutiny. This inquiry will proceed in
185
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several parts. Section II provides a limited general discussion of constitutional
limitations on search and seizure. Section III will discuss search and seizure of
computers in the context of the “plain view” doctrine as an exception to the general
requirement of a warrant for searches and seizures and will show that the “plain
view” doctrine does not apply to closed computer files. Section IV will focus on
search and seizure of computers based on information provided by private party
informants. While the government may make use of informant provided information,
the use is limited and subject to specific criteria. The note will examine the scope of
search and seizure and particularity of warrants with regard to the problem of
intermingled documents and the closed container analogy in Section V. A brief
review of the grand jury subpoena process, as an alternative to the search warrant,
will be considered in Section VI. In closing, this note will summarize the general
direction that computer search and seizure law has taken and provide comments as to
the appropriateness of the direction that the law has taken.
II. CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS ON SEARCHES AND SEIZURES
The Fourth Amendment protects against unreasonable searches and seizures and
certain governmental invasions into private affairs. The Fourth Amendment
provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated,
and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath
or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and
the persons or things to be seized.1

1

U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
The history of the Fourth Amendment indicates that it was drafted in reaction to the use
of general warrants in England that the drafters of the Constitution considered to be an
unreasonable intrusion into privacy that should be prohibited. I WAYNE R. LaFave, SEARCH
AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT, 5-7 (1996). The Fourth
Amendment, as adopted, is both brief and ambiguous. Id. The Fourth Amendment gives no
definition of “unreasonable” and does not set forth detailed information regarding the
conditions for proper issuance of a warrant. Id.
Another commentator noted that:
Moreover, the Fourth Amendment, more than many other parts of the Constitution,
appears to require a fairly high level of abstraction of purpose; its use of the term
“reasonable” (actually “unreasonable”) positively invites construction that change
with changing circumstances. Carol S. Steiker, Second Thoughts About First
Principles, 107 HARV. L. REV. 820, 823-24 (1994).
If we accept this proposition - that the construction of the Fourth Amendment’s
“reasonableness” clause should properly change over time to accommodate constitutional
purposes more general than the Framer’s specific intentions . . . focus on colonial history to
support a disjunctive reading of the “reasonableness” clause and the Warrant Clause and to
attack the exclusionary rule seem short-sighted. Such a focus ignores at least two crucial
changes between colonial times and the present that must inform our current readings of the
Fourth Amendment as a whole. First, at the time of the drafting and ratifying of the Fourth
Amendment, nothing even remotely resembling modern law enforcement existed. The
invention in the nineteenth century of armed, quasi-military, professional police forces, whose
form, function, and daily presence differ dramatically from that of the colonial constabulary,
requires that modern-day judges and scholars rethink both the relationship between
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The protections of the Fourth Amendment apply equally to corporations as well
as to natural persons.2
The Court noted that in protecting privacy interests the courts must act as a check
on “the ‘well-intentioned but mistakenly over-zealous executive officer’ who are a
party of any system of law enforcement.”3 As a result, the Supreme Court has
generally held that unless justified by an exception to the warrant requirement, all
searches should proceed only after issuance of a warrant by a neutral and detached
magistrate.4 It is a well-established doctrine that “searches conducted outside the
judicial process, without prior approval by a judge or magistrate, are per se
unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment subject only to a few specifically
established and well-delineated exceptions.”5
In addition, a neutral magistrate should only issue warrants after demonstration
of probable cause that evidence of a particular crime will be found, and that the
warrant must describe with particularity the place to be searched and the items to be
seized.6 There are numerous exceptions to the warrant requirement including search
incident to arrest, exigent circumstances, inventory searches and searches necessary
to protect officers and others.7
A Fourth Amendment enforcement doctrine, first discussed by the Court in 1914,
is the exclusionary rule.8 The Court held that the courts should exclude from
evidence any evidence seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment from any
prosecution of the defendant from whom the items had been improperly seized.9
Subject to certain exceptions,10 the exclusionary rule prohibits use of any evidence
illegally obtained, testimony regarding observations made during the illegal search,
and any evidence obtained in the illegal search may not be used as a basis for
additional warrants concerning the matter under investigation.11
The Court also views search and seizure in light of a reasonableness test, defined
by Katz v. United States, to determine if a search warrant is required.12 The Katz test

“reasonableness” and “warrants” and the nature of Fourth Amendment remedies. Second, the
intensification of inter-racial conflict in our society . . . necessitate new constructions of the
Fourth Amendment. Id.
2

General Motors Leasing Corp. v. United States, 429 U.S. 338, 353 (1977).

3

United States v. United States District Court, 407 U.S. 297, 316 (1972) (quoting Coolidge
v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 481 (1971)).
4

Id. at 316-17.

5

Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967).

6

Dalia v. United States, 441 U.S. 238, 255 (1979).

7

California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 582 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring).

8

Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914).

9

Id. at 398.

10

See Massachusetts v. Sheppard, 468 U.S. 981 (1984); United States v. Leon, 468 U.S.
897 (1984); Walder v. United States, 347 U.S. 62 (1954).
11

Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 485-86 (1963).

12

Katz, 389 U.S. at 347.
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has two parts: 1) does the individual have a subjective expectation of privacy in the
item or items to be searched and 2) is the subjective expectation of privacy one that
society is prepared to accept as reasonable.13 In California v. Greenwood, the Court
held that although the defendants had a subjective expectation of privacy in garbage
placed at the curb for collection, that expectation was not one which society was
prepared to accept as reasonable.14 The courts have recognized that enclosed spaces
like suitcases, footlockers, briefcases and other closed containers are generally
subject to a very high level of privacy expectation.15 In addition, in 1967 the
Supreme Court held that privacy expectations extend not only to tangible objects but
to intangible items as well.16 When a privacy expectation exists with regard to the
contents of a closed container, a warrant to search the containers contents will
generally be required.17 There are, however, exceptions to the requirement to obtain
a warrant to search the contents of a closed container. For example, the Court
recognized that the government may search a vehicle without a warrant if the search
is supported by probable cause, unlike homes or similar places.18
In Carroll, the Court noted that there was an essential difference between a
vehicle and a fixed structure, where the government may readily obtain a warrant,
“because the vehicle can be quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in
which the warrant must be sought.”19 In United States v. Ross, the Court held that
searching an automobile without a warrant, when the search of the automobile was
supported by probable cause, included the right to search closed containers or
packages found in the automobile.20 This does not, however, mean that the
government has an unlimited right to undertake warrantless searches of closed
containers found in automobiles. In United States v. Chadwick, the Court refused to
extend the rationale of Carroll to a locked footlocker that the government had
probable cause to believe contained marijuana.21 The Court refused to extend
Carroll to this situation indicating that people have greater privacy expectations in
luggage than in their automobiles.22 Police may secure seized luggage in anticipation
of obtaining a warrant to search its contents, unlike the case however with
automobiles that suspects may easily remove from the jurisdiction.23

13

Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J. concurring).

14

California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 39 (1988).

15

United States v. Block, 590 F.2d 535, 541 (4th Cir. 1978).

16

Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 305 (1967).

17

United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 10-11 (1977).

18

Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925).

19

Id. at 153.

20

United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798 (1982).

21

United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1 (1977).

22

Id. at 13.

23

Id.
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The Court, in California v. Acevedo, limited the doctrine established in
Chadwick.24 In Acevedo, the Court held that the government may undertake a
warrantless search of a container located in an automobile, even if they only had
probable cause to believe that the container held evidence of a crime and did not
have probable cause to search the entire vehicle.25 Although an officer may take
possession of a container in anticipation of obtaining a warrant to search its contents,
that authority is separate from any authority to search through the contents of the
container.26 Additionally, a district court held that electronic storage devices, such
as computers, enjoy the same privacy interest as any other closed container.27 Unlike
the garbage in Greenwood28 where the expectation of privacy was not reasonable, a
computer user should have little difficulty establishing a subjective expectation of
privacy in the contents of their computer storage which society is likely to accept as
reasonable. Of course, should the computer be located in an automobile, the
government could argue under Acevedo29 and Ross30 that the government may have
the right to search the computer without a warrant. There are no reported cases of
this scenario, but with the increased use of portable and laptop computers it may
occur in the future. Thus, while a computer is likely to enjoy the same Fourth
Amendment protections as other closed containers, this protection clearly has limits
and depends upon where the container is located.
One does not lose their expectation of privacy in a closed container simply
because it is temporarily out of their control.31 One court noted that such
expectations of privacy “may well be at their most intense when such effects are
deposited temporarily or kept semi-permanently in public places or under the general
control of another.”32 Because a computer is not located in one’s home or not under
one’s control does not lead to the loss of a reasonable expectation of privacy. There
are, however, circumstances under which computer users may lose their reasonable
expectation of privacy. Case law suggests that if a person abandons or otherwise
disclaims his interest in property, the police may properly seize the items and the
evidence can be properly admitted against the defendant.33 Thus if a computer user
makes his equipment readily or routinely available to others, the computer user’s
expectation of privacy may be diminished.
The Court has held, additionally, that disclosure of information to third parties
made voluntarily is done at the risk of loss of a privacy interest of the person making

24

California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565 (1982).

25

Id.

26

Walter v. United States, 447 U.S. 100 (1980).

27

United States v. David, 756 F. Supp. 1385 (D.Nev. 1991).

28

Greenwood, 486 U.S. at 35.

29

Acevedo, 500 U.S. at 565.

30

Ross, 456 U.S. at 798.

31

Block, 590 F.2d at 541.

32

Id.

33

California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 624, 629 (1991).
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the disclosure.34 The persons to whom the information is disclosed may do with the
information as they please including disclosing it to authorities.35 This becomes an
issue when a computer is surrendered to a technician for repair and will be discussed
in more detail in a later section on use of informants. Furthermore, any
computerized information found to fall within the “plain view” doctrine will also
loose any expectation of privacy. The “plain view” doctrine will be discussed in
more detail in the next section.
III. THE PLAIN VIEW DOCTRINE
In Coolidge v. New Hampshire, the Court held that authorities may seize
evidence without a warrant provided the evidence is in plain view.36 In Coolidge, the
Court set forth the requirements for the plain view exception to the warrant
requirement as follows: 1) the officer must be legally in a position to view the object
that is in plain view; 2) the incriminating character of the object must be immediately
apparent to the officer; and 3) the officer must have a lawful right to access the
object itself.37 The Court additionally indicated that “the ‘plain view’ doctrine may
not be used to extend a general exploratory search from one object to another until
something incriminating . . . emerges.”38
The Court again explored the limits of the plain view doctrine in Arizona v.
Hicks.39 In Hicks, a suspect fired a bullet through the floor of his apartment injuring
a man living below.40 Police arrived and entered the suspect’s apartment to search
for evidence related to the shooting. 41 A police officer noticed several sets of
expensive stereo equipment that seemed out of place in the suspect’s apartment.42
The police officer suspected the suspect had stolen the components and moved
several of them so that he could record their serial numbers.43 The officer telephoned
police headquarters, who advised him that they were stolen, and he seized them.44
The Court found that the officer’s moving of the equipment “did constitute a ‘search’
separate and apart from the search for the shooter, victims, and weapons that was the
lawful objective of his entry into the apartment.”45 The Court concluded in Hicks
34

Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 414 (1966).

35

Id.

36

Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 433 (1971).

37

Id. at 466-67. Coolidge additionally required that the discovery of the object or evidence
be inadvertent. This requirement of inadvertent discovery was later dropped by the Court.
See Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128 (1990).
38

Coolidge, 403 U.S. at 466.

39

Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321 (1987).

40

Id. at 323.

41

Id.

42

Id.

43

Id.

44

Hicks, 480 U.S. at 321.

45

Id. at 324-25.
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that the difference between “’looking’ at a suspicious object in plain view and
‘moving’ it even a few inches is much more than trivial for purposes of the Fourth
Amendment.”46 Thus, any action beyond the mere observation of an object will
violate the plain view exception to the warrant requirement.
In Horton v. California, the Court further refined the definition of the “plain
view” doctrine.47 In Horton, the government executed a search warrant to look for
stolen property and found none.48 The police did, however, discover in “plain view”
weapons and other evidence which the police had reason to know was connected to
the robbery under investigation.49 Thus, although the weapons were found in “plain
view” their discovery was not inadvertent since the police were interested in finding
such other evidence that connected the suspect with the robbery.50 The Court held
“that even though inadvertence is a characteristic of most legitimate ‘plain view’
seizures, it is not a necessary condition.”51
Scenarios involving computer search and seizure are somewhat different than the
circumstances described in Hicks52 and Horton53 where the officer was in view of a
physical object. In searches involving computer systems the only thing that arguably
could be in “plain view” is anything that is displayed on the computer screen
without any interference with the computer system by the government. Since even
the most trivial disturbance of an object under Hicks54 violates the plain view
doctrine the question remains whether closed computer files stored on a computer
hard drive can ever fall within the plain view exception. Reviewing the listing of
computer files may indicate that the files contain graphics or pictures (such as those
with .jpg or .gif extensions) just as other file extensions may suggest that they are
database or word processing files.55 The contents of the files, however, cannot be
determined unless one opens the file with the appropriate software and disturbing of
the file by opening or accessing it with software is arguably enough to violate the
“plain view” exception to the warrant requirement. The incriminating character of a

46

Id. at 325

47

Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128 (1990).

48

Id. at 131.

49

Id.

50

Id.

51

Id. at 130.

52

Hicks, 480 U.S. at 321.

53

Horton, 496 U.S. at 128.

54

Hicks, 480 U.S. at 321.

55

The Department of Justice, in discussing search and seizure of computers and computer
files indicates that “if agents with a warrant to search a computer for evidence of narcotics
trafficking find a long list of access codes taped to the computer monitor, the list should also
be seized.” The Department of Justice does not take the position that closed files in the
computer’s memory or storage devices are ever in plain view. Federal Guidelines for
Searching and Seizing Computers (1994), Supplement (October 1997) and Supplement
(January 1999), Department of Justice, Criminal Division, Computer Crime and Intellectual
Property Section. <http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/cybercrime>.
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closed computer file is not immediately apparent as incriminating and cannot fall
within the “plain view” exception to the warrant requirement as defined by
Coolidge56, Hicks57, and Horton58.
Two recent cases suggest that courts will not apply the “plain view” doctrine to
closed computer files on a hard drive. In United States v. Carey, a suspect was under
investigation for illegal drug trafficking and while executing an arrest warrant the
police noticed drug paraphernalia in plain view.59 A police officer asked the
suspect’s consent to search his apartment which he gave fearing that the officers
would trash his apartment if he did not consent.60 During the search police found
quantities of various illegal drugs and two computers.61 Police seized the computers
believing that they would either be subject to forfeiture or contain evidence of drug
dealing and removed them to the police station.62 Later a warrant was obtained
allowing the search of the computer files for “‘names, telephone numbers, ledger
receipts, addresses, and other documentary evidence pertaining to the sale and
distribution of controlled substances.’”63
A detective searched the hard drives for text-based files related to the suspected
drug activity using relevant search words; the search produced no files related to any
drug activity.64 Along with the other files the detective downloaded more than two
hundred JPG or image files alleging that the image files could contain evidence
pertinent to a drug investigation.65 Upon opening one JPG file, the detective
discovered that the file contained child pornography.66 After discovering the first
child pornography file he abandoned his search for drug related files and opened
many JPG files that also appeared to contain images of child pornography.67 He did
not, however, obtain a separate warrant to continue the search for child pornography
after opening the first JPG file.68 The government argued that the child pornography
files were in plain view and officers needed no separate search warrant.69

56

Coolidge, 403 U.S. at 433.

57

Hicks, 408 U.S. at 321.

58

Horton, 496 U.S. at 128.

59

United States v. Carey, 172 F.3d 1268, 1270 (10th Cir. 1999).

60

Id.

61

Id.

62

Id.

63

Id.

64

Carey, 172 F.3d at 1270-71.

65

Id. at 1271.

66

Id.

67

Id.

68

Id.

69

Carey, 172 F.3d at 1272.
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The court held that the detective expanded the scope of his search beyond that
permitted by the warrant when he began opening JPG files.70 The court stated that
after opening the first JPG file the detective “was in the same position as the officers
had been when they first wanted to search the contents of the computers for drug
related evidence. They were aware they had to obtain a search warrant and did so.”71
The court also noted that the images “were in closed files and thus not in plain
view.”72 Additionally, since the government had removed the computers to police
custody there were no exigent circumstances or practical reasons to permit the
warrantless search of the JPG files.73 The court concluded in Carey that once the
detective viewed the contents of the first JPG file, the law required him to shut down
his search for evidence of child pornography and apply for a separate warrant to
search for child pornography before proceeding to open further JPG files.74 Because
the officer did not follow this procedure, the court suppressed all evidence of child
pornography.75
Another recent case addresses these same issues in a somewhat different context.
In United States v. Turner, an intruder with a knife awakened a woman in her
bedroom at around 2:00 a.m..76 A neighbor in the adjacent apartment who claimed
he was seated working at his computer at the time of the assault, telephoned police
saying that he had observed someone fleeing his neighbor’s apartment.77 When
police returned to the scene the next morning, they noticed that the victim’s window
screens and those of the neighbor who had called police the prior morning were ajar
and appeared to be smeared with blood.78 Police asked permission to search the
apartment of the neighbor to look for evidence that the assailant had been in his
apartment, suspecting that the assailant may have entered his apartment as well; he
freely consented to the search.79 While searching the apartment, the computer screen
suddenly illuminated and displayed a photograph of a nude woman who was
physically similar to the neighbor who had been assaulted.80 Upon seeing this image,
an officer seated himself at the suspect’s computer and began searching for recently
accessed files.81 The officer opened a number of JPG files finding various images of
nude women in bondage.82 Upon finding these files, the officer continued to search
70

Id. at 1273.

71

Id.

72

Id.

73

Id. at 1275.

74

Carey, 172 F.3d at 1276.

75

Id.

76

United States v. Turner, 169 F.3d 84, 85 (1st Cir. 1999).

77

Id.

78

Id.

79

Id. at 85-86.

80

Id. at 86.

81

Turner, 169 F.3d at 85-86.

82

Id.
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the hard drive for other files noting that several bore labels like “young” or “young
with breasts.”83 When the officer opened these files, he found what he considered
child pornography files and seized the computer.84
In Turner, the court held that the sexually suggestive image which suddenly
came into “plain view’ did not make Turner’s computer and files subject to search
just because the assault on his neighbor had a sexual component.85 The court noted
that the search of the suspect’s computer files exceeded the scope of his consent.86
When Turner consented to the search of his apartment for “evidence of an assault”
this would reasonably mean physical evidence of the assault and not the type of
documentary evidence one would expect to find stored on a computer hard drive.87
Finding that the search exceeded the reasonable scope of the consent the court
suppressed all evidence that the government had obtain in the warrantless search of
Turner’s apartment.88
Turner89 and Carey90 both illustrate the limits of the “plain view” doctrine with
regard to closed computer files. Carey91 illustrates that even with a proper warrant to
search a suspect’s computer the scope of the search is limited by the terms of the
warrant. Where police are authorized to search for evidence of illegal drug activity
stored on a computer it is not likely that this evidence will be stored in image or
graphics files. In Carey, the court accepted the government’s argument that image
files could potentially show some evidence of illegal drug activity such as
photographs of drugs or growing systems.92 This is absurd in the face of a warrant
that was aimed at names, addresses, and other such documentary evidence of illegal
drug activity.93 No reasonable person would expect lists of names and addresses to
be found in a graphics file; this type of data would generally be stored in word
processing or data base files.94 Carey further allowed that once the officer opened

83

Id. at 86.

84

Id.

85

Id.

86

Turner, 169 F.3d at 86.

87

Id. at 88-89.

88

Id.

89

Id.

90

Carey, 172 F.3d at 1268.

91

Id. at 1274.

92

Id. at 1271.

93

Id. at 1270.

94

Although the names or extensions of files (like .jpg or .gif) can be useful in determining
what type of file one is looking at it is not entirely dispositive. A computer user can choose to
save a file with any name or extension they choose. Thus, a criminal attempting to hide a
database file could save it under a name that what would appear to be a graphics file. Without
information leading the government to believe that the suspect is engaged in this type of
deception most file names are reasonable indications of the type of information contained in a
file.
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the initial graphics file (finding what he believed to be an image of child
pornography) he could have used this finding as probable cause to support a search
warrant to look for evidence of child pornography, even though the court correctly
held that the image was not in “plain view.”95
This analysis is flawed in two ways. First, since it was not reasonable to open a
graphics file under a warrant looking for evidence of illegal drug activity aimed at
names, addresses, and other documentary evidence should not be allowed as
probable cause for a warrant to investigate child pornography. The initial opening of
the first closed graphics file, which was not in “plain view,” was unreasonable and
should invalidate any further search based on this information. Second, in executing
a search warrant for computerized data the government should be required to employ
officers with sufficient knowledge to distinguish various types of computer files.
The officer in Carey claimed that he did not initially know to distinguish a text file
from an image or JPG file.96 If the government is not compelled to employ
knowledgeable officers in executing searches of computers, citizens will be exposed
to unreasonably broad searches of their computer files simply because the
government employs ignorant personnel. The courts should set minimum standards
for the training of personnel involved in investigations of computer based crimes.
Turner provides that even if an image comes into plain view on a computer
screen this does not necessarily support expansion of a search to the contents of the
computer’s memory and closed files.97 If the image does not relate to the evidence
for which the officer has consent to search he or she cannot expand his or her search
to the computer’s memory when this extension is not reasonable.98 In Turner, the
image that came into “plain view” was a picture of a nude woman with “lightcolored hair.”99 This photograph was not evidence of any crime and did not support
the officer’s review of closed computer files on Turner’s computer which went
beyond the scope of Turner’s consent.100
Three other cases illustrate situations where computer files or machine-readable
media were considered to meet the definition of “plain view.” In City of Akron v.
Patrick, a suspect was under investigation for suspected illegal gambling activities.101
Police executed a search warrant on the suspect’s home and observed two
computers.102 The screen of one computer displayed the words “Advanced,
Declined, Unchanged.”103 One officer, based on his experience, recognized these
terms as relating to a gambling game based upon stock quotations and called in a
police expert who determined that the computers were being used in a gambling
95

Carey, 172 F.3d at 1273.

96

Id. at 1271.

97

Turner, 169 F.3d at 88.

98

Id.

99

Id. at 86.

100

Id.

101

City of Akron v. Patrick, 1982 WL 5049 (Ohio Ct. App. 1982).

102

Id. at *1.

103

Id.
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operation.104 Officers then seized the computers and various diskettes as evidence.105
The defendant in Patrick argued that since the warrant did not specifically list the
computers, the seizure was unlawful.106 One of the officers testified that when the
computer screen displayed the words “Advanced, Declined, Unchanged” based on
his experience and knowledge of gambling operations, he immediately recognized
that the suspect was using the computers in an illegal gambling operation.107
The court held that the officer’s observation of the words on the computer display
was in “plain view” since the officer was legally in a position to view the computer
screen, the incriminating character of the information on the computer screen was
immediately apparent to the police officer, and the officer had the legal right to view
the computer screen by virtue of the search warrant.108 This case is unlike Carey109
and Turner110 where the government argued in an attempt to extend the “plain view”
doctrine to closed files on the computer hard drive. In Patrick, the “plain view”
doctrine was applicable because the incriminating use of the computer was
immediately apparent to the officers from the information displayed on the computer
monitor.111 Patrick did not involve an attempt by the government to apply to “plain
view” doctrine to closed files on the computer hard drive.112 Because the
incriminating use of the computer was immediately apparent to the officers, the
search and seizure fulfilled the requirements of the “plain view” doctrine in
Patrick.113 The court allowed the seizure of the computers as gambling paraphernalia
under the original search warrant.114 The opinion does not indicate that any further
warrants were required to search the contents of the seized computer equipment.115
In Oklahoma v. One Pioneer CD-ROM Changer, a suspect was under
investigation for violations of state obscenity laws.116 Having purchased obscene CD
ROMs from the suspect the police obtained a search warrant for the suspect’s
home.117 While executing the warrant the officers came upon a large computer
system the monitor of which displayed the words “viewing” and/or “copying” along

104

Id.

105

Id.

106

Patrick, 1982 WL 5049 at *4.

107

Id.

108

Id.

109

Carey, 172 F.3d at 1268.

110

Turner, 169 F.3d at 84.

111

Patrick, 1982 WL 5049 at *4.

112

Id.

113

Id.

114

Id.

115

Id.

116

Oklahoma v. One Pioneer CD-ROM Changer, 891 P.2d 600 (Okla. Ct. App. 1994).

117

Id. at 604.
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with other descriptions like “lesbian sex” and/or “oral sex.”118 The court noted that
the display of these words was in “plain view” during the search, making the
incriminating use of the computer immediately apparent to the government, and
therefore, the seizure of the computers was justified without a warrant under the
“plain view” doctrine.119
In Ivatury v Texas, police were investigating a defense industry espionage case.120
The police executed a warrant for the search of the suspect’s safe deposit box for
certain photographs and other evidence.121 The police discovered a computer tape
among the contents of the safe deposit box and recognized it as a special type of tape
used in the defense industry and seized it.122 The court held that the seizure met the
requirements of the “plain view” doctrine noting that: 1) the police possessed a
valid search warrant for the safe deposit box; 2) police discovered the tape
inadvertently; and 3) it was immediately apparent that the tape was contraband.123
Here the officer recognized the tape as a special type used in the defense industry
and as the type of tape the suspect had previously offered to sell him with stolen
defense industry information.124
Viewed together, these cases indicate that courts will not extend the “plain view”
doctrine to unopened computer files on a computer hard drive. When authorities fail
to discover evidence of the crime for which they have a proper warrant or consent,
the courts will not permit them to abandon this search in hopes of finding evidence
of other unspecified criminal activity. In keeping with Coolidge,125 the cases
involving computers and the “plain view” doctrine have not allowed extensions of
general exploratory searches. In addition, in Carey126 when an officer inadvertently
came across evidence of another crime for which he did not have a valid warrant, the
court required the officer to shut down the search and apply for further authorization
from a neutral magistrate. The three cases where the courts extended the “plain
view” doctrine to computer files or computer media all involved cases where the
computer screen clearly and prominently displayed evidence of a crime without any
disturbance from the authorities or where the officers knew that an item of machine
readable media was contraband from their prior dealings with the suspect.127 The
courts did not, however, extend the “plain view” doctrine to closed computer files on
a computer hard drive.

118

Id.

119

Id. at 605.

120

Ivatury v. Texas, 792 S.W.2d 845 (Tex. Ct. App. 1990).

121

Id. at 850.

122

Id.

123

Id. at 851.

124

Id.

125

Coolidge, 403 U.S. at 466.

126

Carey, 172 F.3d at 1275.

127

One Pioneer CD-ROM Changer, 891 P.2d 600; Ivatury, 792 S.W.2d at 845; Patrick,
1982 WL 5049.
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Thus, although the cases dealing with computer systems are few in number as of
this time, a general exploration of any and all closed files on a computer is not likely
to be upheld by the courts nor will the closed files be found to fall under the “plain
view” doctrine. This approach is proper and in line with Hicks.128 If the mere
movement of a stereo component a few inches was sufficient to violate the Fourth
Amendment, the random opening of numerous closed computer files, when not
properly authorized by a search warrant or covered by the scope of a consent, also
violates the Fourth Amendment.
IV. INFORMANTS
The Fourth Amendment limits state action with regard to searches and seizures.
The limitations of the Fourth Amendment do not bind the actions of private parties.
The Supreme Court has held that “a wrongful search or seizure conducted by a
private party does not violate the Fourth Amendment and that such private
wrongdoing does not deprive the government of the right to use evidence that it has
acquired lawfully.”129 In Coolidge, the Court established that the court must
determine if the private party acted as the “instrument or agent” of the government
when the private party conducted the search.130 In United States v. Miller, the factors
to be considered in determing if a private party acted as an instrument or agent of the
government are listed as: “(1) whether the government knew of or acquiesced in the
intrusive conduct, and (2) whether the party performing the search intended to assist
law enforcement efforts or to further his own ends.”131
The fact that there are but a few reported cases involving private party searches
of computers should not be taken as an indication that this situation does not raise
serious privacy concerns. Whenever citizens take their computers for repair or
upgrade, the equipment is exposed to the prying eyes of the technician who works on
the equipment. In the course of making the necessary repairs, the technician has a
legitimate need to access computer files to determine if the machine functions
properly. In this process, all of the computer’s files are potentially exposed to
review by the technician. This raises concerns in that, as we have seen, private
parties are not bound by the limitations of the Fourth Amendment, and therefore, any
evidence of suspected criminality could be reported to the police by the repair
company and potentially used by the government to support a search warrant for the
computer files.132 How courts viewed reports of potential evidence of criminality by
informants played out differently in the reported cases as we will see.

128

Hicks, 480 U.S. at 321.

129

Walter v. United States, 447 U.S. 649, 656 (1980). See also, Coolidge, 403 U.S. at 48790; United States v. Blocker, 104 F.3d 720, 725 (5th Cir. 1997).
130

Coolidge, 403 U.S. at 487.

131

United States v. Miller, 688 F.2d 652, 657 (9th Cir. 1982).

132

Although this will not be discussed in this note, the repair process raises client
confidentially concerns for professionals like attorneys, accountants, or physicians who’s
computers may contain client information that they are required, by the standards of their
respective professions, to hold in confidence.
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In United States v. Hall, a defendant took his computer to a computer repair
company.133 A computer technician accessed several file directories in an attempt to
diagnose the problems with the computer.134 The technician noted that some
directories and files had unusual names that implied sexual content; one file was
titled “Boys 612.”135 The technician viewed the file and found that it appeared to
contain an image of young naked boys, who he estimated to be between ten and
twelve years of age engaged in anal sex.136 The technician proceeded to view a
number of other files that he also judged to contain images of child pornography and
estimated that there were around 1,000 files on the hard drive that had names
implying that they contained images of child pornography.137 The technician
subsequently telephoned a member of the Illinois State Police, who was a personal
friend of his, and informed him of what he had found on the computer.138
At the request of police, the repair person copied a number of the images to a
diskette which he gave to the police (according to the opinion no officers viewed the
contents of the diskette).139 The police and FBI requested that the repair company
inform the customer that his computer repairs would take several additional days
since the store needed to order additional parts.140 Using the informant’s descriptions
of what he had viewed, but not the information on the diskette, the government
obtained a warrant to search the customer’s computer and residence.141 The search
of the computer hard drive confirmed that it contained child pornography and they
prosecuted the customer for possession of the images.142 The defendant moved to
suppress the evidence contending that it was discovered in violation of the Fourth
Amendment.143 The court found that the repairman’s viewing of computer files was
done in the course of repairing a computer in the normal course of business with the
sole purpose of repairing the computer.144 The Government had no knowledge of the
repair and did not instruct the repair person to inspect the files; in fact, no
government officials were contacted until after the files were discovered.145 The
court further noted that the repairman’s “statements to law enforcement personnel
formed a sufficient basis of probable cause to support the search warrants. With

133

United States v. Hall, 142 F.3d 988, 991 (7th Cir. 1998).

134

Id.

135

Id.

136

Id.

137

Id.

138

Hall, 142 F.3d at 991.

139

Id.

140

Id.

141

Id.

142

Id. at 992.

143

Hall, 142 F.3d at 992.

144

Id. at 993.

145

Id.
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lawfully issued warrants, the same files that [the repairman] copied onto disk for
[police] were independently discovered by the Government. . .”146 Citing the
independent source doctrine, the court allowed the admission of the evidence.147
In United States v. Barth, a defendant took his computer to a self-employed
computer consultant for repairs.148 In diagnosing the computer problems, the
consultant happened upon and viewed several JPG files and observed images of
child pornography.149 He then contacted an FBI agent who was his supervising agent
as a confidential informant for the bureau.150 The agent instructed the consultant to
copy all of the hard disk files onto diskettes and that the agent would have the
diskettes picked up.151 The court found that the consultant’s initial viewing of the
JPG files did not violate the Fourth Amendment because he did not intend to assist
law enforcement officers when he initially viewed the file and merely did so in an
effort to repair the computer.152 Once the consultant notified his supervising agent at
the FBI and was instructed to view and copy additional files, the court concluded that
these actions were attributable to the Government.153 Additionally, once the
consultant had copied the contents of the hard disk to diskette, these files were
subsequently viewed by law enforcement officials without the benefit of a search
warrant.154 The court held that the search violated the two part test in Miller155 and
ordered the evidence from the search of the defendant’s computer suppressed.156
A third case, United States v. Harned, involving an informant resulted in the
exclusion of evidence for an entirely different reason than the previous case.157 A
customer had taken a computer to a repair shop for service and, in the course of
testing the computer, the technician discovered a CD-ROM disk with files labeled
with boys names.158 The technician viewed several of the files and felt that they
depicted child pornography.159 The technician notified the police and an officer went

146

Id. at 994.

147

Id.

148

United States v. Barth, 26 F. Supp.2d 929 (W.D. Tex. 1998).

149

Id. at 932.

150

Id. The opinion does not give any indication as to nature of the consultant’s
involvement with the FBI but simply indicates that he was a confidential informant for the
FBI.
151

Id.

152

Barth, 26 F. Supp.2d at 935-36.

153

Id. at 936.

154

Id. at 937.

155

United States v. Miller, 688 F.2d 652, 657 (9th Cir. 1982).

156

Barth, 26 F. Supp.2d at 942.

157

United States v. Harned, 182 F.3d 928 (9th Cir. 1999).
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Id.

159

Id.
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to the repair shop to view several of the described files.160 The officer prepared a
search warrant application and stated to the judge that there were around 489 files
and that they involved acts of masturbation.161 The government subsequently
indicted the defendant on child pornography charges.162 The defendant moved to
suppress the evidence based on grounds that the officer had intentionally or
recklessly included material false statements in his warrant application.163 The court
found two falsehoods in the application: first, very few of the images involved
depictions of both children and adults; and second, the description of the sexual acts
as masturbation was found to be false.164 “The court also found that the affiant acted
with reckless disregard for the truth by including those false statements in the
affidavit. Finally, the court held that the affidavit provided only a ‘bare conclusion’
insufficient for probable cause once the false statements were redacted.”165 The court
found that the government based the warrant application exclusively on “the
conclusory statement of a computer store employee.”166 The court noted that what
may have been an explicit sexual act involving child pornography to the computer
store employee, may not have been so to a neutral magistrate.167 Neither the
employee nor the officer who prepared the affidavit had sufficient experience to
adequately judge the nature of the files they had viewed.168 The court suppressed all
of the evidence and noted “that probable cause for a search warrant may not rest
entirely upon the bare conclusion of a computer store employee as to the nature of
the photographs.”169
Certain guidelines are apparent from these three cases regarding use of third
party informants. Taking Barth170 and Hall171 together, it appears that government
use of information from a private party search is a simple matter. Since private
searches do not implicate the protections of the Fourth Amendment, it would appear

160

Id.

161

Id.

162

Harned, 182 F.3d at 928.

163

Id.

164

Id.

165

Id.

166

Id.

167

Harned, 182 F.3d at 928.

168

Id.

169

Id. In another case involving a prosecution involving child pornography one expert
testified at trial regarding how individuals who use computers to view child pornography,
name, and organize their files. United States v. Simpson, 152 F.3d 1241, 1245 (10th Cir.
1998). A second expert, with extensive expertise in determining the age children of children
in images, provided testimony to determine that images were actually child pornography and
to testify to the age of the children portrayed in the images. Id. The determination of what
constitutes child pornography is not a simple matter within the grasp of the average lay person.
170

Barth, 26 F. Supp.2d at 929.

171

Hall, 142 F.3d at 988.
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that such information is readily usable by law enforcement. In Barth however, if the
private party acts as an “instrument or agent” of the government, the search may
implicate Fourth Amendment considerations.
Barth172 tells us that if law
enforcement provides direction to the third party with regard to expanding the
private search and thus the additional intrusion by the third party is intended to assist
law enforcement, the two part Miller173 test is violated. In Hall,174 the Miller175 test
was not violated because law enforcement used the information provided by the third
party to apply for a search warrant only. Law enforcement did not direct the third
party in Hall to expand his search and the informant did not make the initial
discovery of contraband in an attempt to assist law enforcement.176 In addition, in
Barth,177 law enforcement officials viewed a number of computer files before
obtaining a warrant; in Hall, the government testified that they had not viewed the
contents of any files before obtaining a search warrant for the computer.178
In the alternative, Harned179 indicates that courts may be reluctant to base
probable cause on the conclusion of a layperson informant in certain situations.
Judging what constitutes child pornography may require considerable expertise.
Harned indicates that unless the third party informant has the expertise to properly
evaluate the information he has found, his conclusions about the nature of the
material may not be sufficient to support a search warrant.180 While the Harned181
case involved child pornography, if a case involved such items such as financial,
insurance or medical information, the government should be required to show that
the informant had the proper expertise to judge the nature of the information he or
she had viewed that was used as a probable cause for a search warrant application.
Law enforcement must use care when using the results of third party information as a
basis for broad searches of computer data. Based on the cases reviewed above,
defendants can challenge informant information if the informant’s actions implicated
government action; if the government in any way directs the informants actions or
views informant provided evidence prior to obtaining a warrant the courts have been
reluctant to find the search valid. In addition, the defendant can challenge the
expertise of the informant in judging the nature of the information he or she has
discovered if the evidence is of the type that generally require specialized training or
knowledge to make a correct assessment of what the informant discovered. Taken
together, the cases to date indicate that although the government is free to use
information from private party searches the information must be properly evaluated,
172

Barth, 26 F. Supp.2d at 936.

173

Miller, 688 F.2d at 657.

174

Hall, 142 F.3d at 993-94.

175

Miller, 688 F.2d at 657.
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Hall, 142 F.3d at 993.
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Barth, 26 F. Supp.2d at 933.
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Hall, 142 F.3d at 993.
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Harned, 182 F.3d at 928.
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Id.
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Id.
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used with care, and the government must avoid directing the efforts of the informants
with which the government has contact.
V. SCOPE OF SEARCH AND SEIZURE AND PARTICULARITY OF WARRANTS
A. The Closed Container Analogy & Particularity of Warrants
This note explained earlier that computer storage has been compared to other
non-electronic closed containers for purposes of the Fourth Amendment.
Analogizing computer storage to a closed container establishes a high level of Fourth
Amendment protection for computer memory. This analogy, however, does present
certain problems. When a small computerized address book or pager is compared to
a closed container, this makes a great deal of sense since these devices will generally
have the ability to store a limited amount of information all of which is similar.
When applied to a larger computer storage device, such as a PC hard drive that has
the ability to store a vast amount of information of various types, the closed
container analogy is limited. If the closed container analogy is applied to a large
computer system, then a warrant issued for a search of the computer would allow for
unlimited review of the entire contents of the computer’s memory. If the computer
contains information subject to lawful search and seizure which is intermingled with
other information that is not evidence of any crime, should the police be required to
do any initial sorting to determine what files are within the scope of the warrant or
simply go randomly looking through any and all files they may encounter? The
courts have applied the closed container analogy to computer systems on a number
of occasions.
In United States v. Simpson, the police obtained a warrant to search for evidence
of child pornography.182 In executing the warrant the police seized 19 videotapes, 18
diskettes, a number of documents and the suspect’s entire computer.183 The
defendant argued that the computer disks and hard drives are closed containers
separate from the computer itself, and that in the absence of exigent circumstances, a
separate search warrant to look at the contents of these components was required.184
The court rejected this argument, finding that once a warrant was issued for search of
child pornography files, the computer and any components and storage devices on
the computer were within the scope of the warrant since the evidence covered by the
warrant could reasonably be found in computer storage.185 Essentially, the court
used the closed container analogy making the entire contents of the computer storage
subject to review without further supervision from a neutral magistrate.186
182

United States v. Simpson, 152 F.3d 1241, 1244 (10th Cir. 1998).

183

Id.

184

Id. at 1248.

185

Id.

186

In an earlier case the same court upheld the wholesale seizure to computer equipment
where the warrant only specified that “equipment” could be seized without specifying that
computers were included under this description. Davis v. Gracey, 111 F.3d 1472, 1478-79
(10th Cir. 1997). The court noted that the test for overbreadth of a warrant should be applied
in a “common sense fashion.” Id. at 1478. The description need only be as specific as the
nature of the activity under investigation allows. Id. In this case, where the police were
searching for obscene materials, it could be reasonable to assume that computers could contain
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In United States v. Lacey, the court allowed another wholesale seizure of a
defendant’s computer system.187 The warrant application described the computer in
generic terms and also allowed for seizure of any computer diskettes found at the
scene.188 The government had probable cause to believe that the defendant had
downloaded child pornography files but did not know if the images were stored on
the computer’s hard disk or on one of many computer disks in the defendants
possession.189 There was simply no way to specify what hardware and software had
to be seized in order to retrieve the images.190 In addition, the court noted that the
warrant application “established probable cause to believe that [the defendant’s]
entire computer system was ‘likely to contain evidence of criminal activity.’”191 The
court also found that the warrant contained objective limits to direct officers to the
acceptable range of files that they could seize.192 The court allowed admission of the
evidence and found no error in allowing the police to make a wholesale seizure of
the computer equipment without any attempt to sort for relevant information onsite.193
The court in United States v. Musson permitted seizure of 54 computer diskettes
for later review and sorting off-site under a warrant specifying “correspondence,
memoranda, ledgers, and any records and writings of whatsoever nature” detailing
transactions of certain companies.194 The defendant argued that seizure of the
computer disks was outside the scope of the warrant since computer disks where not
described in the warrant as an item to be seized and that the evidence on the disks
should be excluded.195 The court noted that in the age of modern technology and the
commercial availability of various storage media, it was not possible for a warrant to
specify what form the records might take.196 Again, this consisted of a wholesale
seizure of a large volume of intermingled documents without any need to attempt to
sort them on-site.197
such items. Id. at 1479. The fact that computer equipment was not specifically listed in the
warrant application was not considered relevant by the court. Id. The court noted that the
only basis for invalidating warrants for overbreadth is where the language of a warrant
authorizes the seizure of all documents without regard to their relevance to criminal activity.
Davis, 112 F.3d 1478-89. The court did not require the police to undertake any on-site sorting
for relevant information as suggested in Tamura. Id.
187

United States v. Lacey, 119 F.3d 742 (9th Cir. 1996).

188

Id. at 746.

189

Id.

190

Id. at 746-47.

191

Id. at 746 (quoting United States v. Kow, 58 F.3d 423, 427 (9th Cir. 1995)).

192

Lacey, 119 F.3d at 746.
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Id. at 746-47.
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United States v. Musson, 650 F. Supp. 525, 531-32 (D. Colo. 1986).
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Id. at 532.
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Id.
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A number of other cases allowed for wholesale seizure of computer equipment for later
off-site sorting without additional approval from a magistrate essentially applying the closed
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B. The Problem of Intermingled Documents
The problem of over broad searches and seizure arise when executing warrants to
search the contents of computer storage devices. The hard drives of computers
frequently store information of various types and many people use their computers as
repositories for both business and personal information. The problem arises when
information related to criminal activity and subject to lawful search and seizure is
intermingled with personal information not subject to seizure that is likely to be the
case with computer storage. In Andresen v. Maryland, the Supreme Court
recognized the problem of intermingled documents when it noted the following:
We recognize that there are grave dangers inherent in executing a warrant
authorizing the search and seizure of a person’s papers that are not necessarily
present in executing a warrant to search for physical objects whose relevance is more
easily ascertainable. In searches for papers, it is certain that some innocuous
documents will be examined, at least cursorily, in order to determine whether they
are, in fact, among those papers authorized to be seized. . . . In . . . searches,
responsible officials, including judicial officials, must take care to assure that they
are conducted in a manner that minimizes unwarranted intrusions upon privacy.198
Because computers contain a large quantity and variety of information, police
must conduct searches carefully to prevent unwarranted intrusions on privacy
warned of in Andresen.199
In United States v. Tamura, the Ninth Circuit court addressed the problem of
intermingled documents directly and formulated a special method for handling these
searches.200 Although this search did not involve computer files, the principles apply
well to search of computerized files. In Tamura, the police had a warrant that listed
three specific categories of accounting records that the government could properly
seize.201 The records that the officers were looking for were intermingled with
thousands of other accounting records and finding any one item of evidence involved
container analogy to computer equipment. See, United States v. Longo, 70 F. Supp.2d 225
(W.D.N.Y. 1999) (allowing broad search of computer files); United States v. Gawrysiak, 972
F. Supp. 853 (D. N.J. 1997) (seizing all computer files without determination of those relevant
to the scope of the search warrant was permissable and did not allow for blanket suppression
of all evidence), aff’d, 178 F.3d 1281 (3d Cir. 1999); United States v. Kufrovich, 997 F. Supp.
246 (D. Conn. 1997) (permitting blanket seizure of computer without any on-site sorting for
evidence relevant to the crime under investigation); United States v. Stewart, No. CRIM.A.
96-583, 1997 WL 189381 (E.D.Pa. Apr. 16, 1997) (allowing seizure of all computer hardware
and software along with a large quantity of documents for later review off-site); United States
v. Hersch, No. CRIM.A. 93-10339-Z, 1994 WL 568728 (D. Mass. Sept. 27, 1994) (finding
that a search warrant calling for the seizure of all computer hardware, software and related
equipment was not a general search given the complexity of the scheme under investigation).
198

Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463, 482 (1976).

199

Id. at 463.

200
United States v. Tamura, 694 F.2d 591 (9th Cir. 1982). See also, United States v.
Shilling, 826 F.2d 1365 (4th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1043 (1988); United States v.
Abram, 830 F. Supp. 551, 554 (D.Kan. 1993) (citing Tamura, and holding that large seizure of
intermingled documents for later sorting without judicial supervision violated the Fourth
Amendment).
201

Tamura, 694 F.2d at 594.
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tracing the transaction through a string of printouts.202 After searching for records
for a short time the agents felt that the process would take inordinate amounts of time
unless the employees of the suspect company assisted them in their search.203 The
employees refused to help the officers whereupon they seized all of the company’s
accounting records for the years in question, removed the records to another location,
and sifted through the records to extract the evidence at a later date.204 As a result of
seizing all of the accounting records for several years, the government took large
quantities of documents that the search warrant did not list.205
In Tamura, the government argued that since the documents were intermingled
and separating those described in the warrant from irrelevant ones was difficult, the
wholesale seizure for later sorting off-site was reasonable.206 The suspect argued that
the government should have remained on the premises until all relevant items were
found or should have obtained an additional warrant to seize all of the accounting
records.207 The court stated that such a wholesale seizure of items not listed in the
warrant for later examination did not comport with the requirements of the Fourth
Amendment.208 The court stated that “[i]n the comparatively rare instances where
. . .” relevant and irrelevant documents are so intermingled such that sorting on-site
is not practical, the court stated that the government should seal the records and a
neutral magistrate should approve any further search.209 “If the need for transporting
the documents is known to the officers prior to the search, they may apply for
specific authorization for large-scale removal of material, which should be granted
only where on-site sorting is infeasible and no other practical alternative exists.”210
The Tamura court noted that the essential safeguard is that in a wholesale removal of
documents a neutral magistrate must monitor the process.211 Simply because
wholesale removal is convenient to the government, when a neutral magistrate has
not monitored it, does not make it reasonable.212 The court did note, however, that
“where the Government’s wholesale seizures were motivated by considerations of
practicality rather than by a desire to engage in indiscriminate ‘fishing’” the seizure
may be reasonable.213 In Tamura, the government found it convenient to seize a
large volume of paper documents containing both relevant and irrelevant
information. Government seizure of an entire personal computer and hard disk that
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is small and easy to transport for later off-site sorting may be a tempting alternative.
In addition, in the age of computerization, the cases of intermingled documents will
no longer be comparatively rare but more than likely the case. Next we will examine
several cases that apply elements of the Tamura test to computer search and seizure.
In United States v. Upham, the government obtained a warrant to search a
suspect’s computer for images of child pornography.214 The warrant listed material
to be seized with particularity and among other items it authorized seizure of “any
and all computer software and hardware, . . . computer disks, disk drives . . . Any and
all visual depictions, in any format or media, of minors engaging in sexually explicit
conduct.”215 The court indicated that if the images could have been obtained easily
by on-site inspection and sorting there would be no justification for wholesale
seizure of the computer hardware that contained intermingled relevant and irrelevant
files.216 However, the court went on to note that it is not an easy task to search every
item of a hard drive, here even searching for previously deleted information that the
police recovered, looking for relevant information.217 The record in this case showed
that the off-site search for images could not have readily been done on-site and based
on considerations of practicality the court allowed the wholesale seizure.218 The
warrant in Upham fulfilled the requirements of Tamura in that the warrant
specifically authorized, in advance, the wholesale seizure of the computer equipment
allowing the later off-site sorting of the information.219 In an additional twist the
court allowed admission of evidence of images that the suspect had previously
deleted from his hard drive, finding that the recovered files were competent evidence
of possession of the images prior to their deletion.220 The government used a utility
program to recover the previously deleted material and the court found that this “is
not different than decoding a coded message lawfully seized or pasting together
scraps of a torn-up ransom note.”221
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had sufficient evidence from files that the suspect had not deleted and this additional evidence
was not necessary to obtain a conviction. Second, allowing evidence of recovered, previously
deleted files does not allow for possible inadvertent acquisition of unwanted files by a
computer user. Take for example a computer user who receives and e-mail message with an
attached graphics file. Until the computer user instructs the computer to download the image,
and subsequently opens the image with software the computer user has no knowledge of what
the image contains. If after downloading and accessing the file the user finds the image of no
use, offensive, or simply needs to clear hard disk space the user can delete the file. In such a
case, the image was innocently obtained and should not be allowed as evidence if the
government later recovers the image.
221
When files are deleted from a hard drive a computer user can often recover the
information using a utility program or the undelete function of the computer. Until the hard
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United States v. Sissler involved a prosecution for sale and distribution of illegal
drugs in which the police executed a search warrant authorizing the seizure of drugs,
related paraphernalia, proceeds, records of drug transactions, records of marijuana
customers, and suppliers among other items.222 Officials seized a large number of
documents, around five hundred computer disks and a personal computer.223 Both
the computer and disks contained a large number of items that the search warrant did
not authorize.224 Citing Tamura, the court noted that practical considerations
justified the large seizure and not a desire to go on an indiscriminate “fishing”
expedition.225 Regarding the computer and the disks, the court noted that the
suspects had often used passwords and other security devices to prevent access to the
stored files and as such accessing the computer files was a relatively complex and
time consuming procedure.226 The police brought in a computer expert to “crack”
these security measures and gain access to the information, a process that took a
great deal of time and effort and could not reasonably be accomplished on-site.227
United States v. Abram involved another situation in which the police seized a
large volume of items beyond those described in the warrant, and the seizure was
found to violate the test in Tamura.228 The warrant authorized agents to seize
information primarily related to insurance income proceeds and premium payments
and also computers and related equipment.229 The government seized entire filing
cabinets, a computer and a small green filing box without making any review of the
contents before the seizure.230 One officer later testified that it took no more than
five to ten minutes to review the contents of the seized items to determine if they
contained evidence relevant to the investigation and that undertaking this review onsite would not have been burdensome.231 The court found that this case was unlike
Tamura where practical considerations motivated the wholesale seizure, and found
that agents have seized all documents they found simply for their own convenience
without any review regarding relevance.232 The court found that the agents had acted

drive space, previously occupied by the deleted information, is overwritten with new
information this is generally possible. The court noted that the recovered images were
competent evidence of a crime committed before they were deleted.
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“in flagrant disregard for the terms of the search warrant issued” and ordered all
evidence suppressed.233
The approach set forth in Tamura234 is a useful one which should be followed. If
applied properly, the Tamura235 procedure will provide that legitimate searches of
computers are conducted in the least intrusive way possible. There are, however,
problems with the approach as proposed in Tamura.236 Although the court suggested
that when wholesale seizure is to be anticipated, this should be indicated in the initial
application for a search warrant. But the court went on to note that when the police
arrive on the scene and find that practical considerations make on-site sorting for
relevant information impossible, a wholesale seizure of files and equipment may be
justified even if authority to do so was not applied for in advance. While there have
been a limited number of cases involving computer search and seizure that followed
Tamura,237 it appears all too easy for police to show “practical considerations” to
justify wholesale seizure and later off-site sorting for relevant information. Taken
together, Sissler238 and Upham239 indicate that courts accept the assertion of
“practical considerations” all too readily. In addition, there was no information in
Upham240 and Sissler241 to suggest that the later off-site sorting was further
supervised by judicial authority as Tamura242 suggested was appropriate. In
Abram,243 the court excluded the evidence only because the government admitted
that they made no attempt to sort the information prior to the wholesale seizure of the
intermingled files.
The government’s actions should not need to rise to this level to invoke the
protections of Tamura.244 How long should the government be required to stay onsite to sort for relevant documents? The courts simply do not provide any objective
standards against which to judge the reasonableness of the government’s assertion of
“practical considerations” when providing a justification for a wholesale seizure of
computer equipment. One can hardly imagine any case involving search of a
computer hard drive, that may contain tens of thousands of intermingled relevant and
irrelevant files, where a case could not be made that it is impracticable to sort
through this mass of data on-site. Indeed, such a process would be time consuming.
On the other hand, operating systems like Windows provides search engines which
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allow one to quickly narrow the search for relevant documents. It could be argued
that searching for relevant documents on a computer hard drive, with the aid of
search engines and utility programs, may actually be more efficient than manually
searching through a large paper file cabinet unaided by technology. Allowing
wholesale seizure of entire computers allows possible intrusions into private matters
that have no relevance to commission of any crime. In addition, a computer user
may make use of the equipment for a variety of purposes both criminal and
legitimate. If the entire computer is seized to allow off-site sorting for relevant
information, the users entire legitimate, business and personal life may be
unreasonably disrupted in the process. A citizen should be able to pursue his
legitimate business interests even while under investigation for an alleged criminal
violation. Only through strict application of the Tamura approach to computer
searches and seizures can peoples’ legitimate privacy interests be adequately
protected. The courts have simply applied the Tamura245 approach far too carelessly.
The cases applying the closed container analogy to computer searches and
seizures and allowing wholesale seizure of equipment for later off-site sorting are far
more numerous than the cases which follow the Tamura246 approach. Taken
together, these “closed container” cases present several dangers. First, the
government is given virtually free rein to seize computer systems and computer
storage media when such items are not specified in the warrant. The courts have
upheld, on many occasions, very broadly worded warrants. Second, unlike the
Tamura247 approach, these cases do not require the government to undertake any onsite sorting of relevant from irrelevant documents or a showing of practical
considerations that such on-site sorting is not possible prior to a wholesale seizure of
computer equipment. The privacy interests of the citizen who is under investigation
are weighed against the convenience of the government in performing their
investigative functions, and the balance is struck in favor of the interests of
government convenience. If the government is compelled to follow the Tamura248
approach, computer searches and seizures will be undertaken in the least intrusive
way possible. This, however, is not the trend in which computer search and seizure
cases are headed; the trend is headed, in fact, in the direction of allowing searches
and seizures to be undertaken in a manner that allows greater and greater invasion of
government into personal privacy.
VI. THE SUBPOENA PROCESS
Thus far this note has examined searches and seizures of computers in the context
of search warrants and the different approaches that courts have taken in construction
of warrants. There have been a limited number of cases involving government
attempts to gain access to computerized evidence of a crime that involved grand jury
subpoenas rather than search warrants. Reported cases of this process are few in
number. They do, however, provide useful lessons with regard to how investigations
of crimes that involve computers, at least in certain contexts, may be more
245
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appropriately undertaken. The subpoena process generally analogizes computer
equipment to a file cabinet rather than the “closed container” analogy that we have
already examined.
In re Horowitz involved a grand jury subpoena for records that were not
computerized.249 The subpoena required a suspect’s accountant to produce “the
contents of all three file cabinets” located at the accountant’s office.250 Prior to the
production of any documents the accountant challenged the subpoena arguing that
the request for the contents of entire file cabinets, without regard to the relevance of
what they contained, was overly broad.251 The district court narrowed the subpoena
to exclude personal documents contained in the filing cabinets.252 The Second
Circuit further narrowed the subpoena indicating that “the government must make a
minimal showing that, in light of other evidence that has been obtained, the paper
may be relevant to the grand jury’s investigation of a federal crime.”253 The court
allowed that if the defendants can show “that a particular category of documents can
have no conceivable relevance to any legitimate object of investigation” they need
not be produced.254 This decision indicates that subpoenas should not be directed at
whole filing cabinets, but at categories of documents that the cabinets may contain
that may be relevant to investigation of a crime. Essentially, the person served with
a subpoena is permitted to sort through and produce only documents relevant to the
crime under investigation.
In re Subpoena Duces Tecum,255 the court applied the approach in Horowitz256
directly to a subpoena aimed at computer equipment.257 The subpoena demanded
production of computer hard drives, and floppy disks that the grand jury conceded
contained information irrelevant to the investigation rather than being directed at
categories of information contained on the computerized media.258 The court noted
that the government admitted that the subpoena demanded production of various
irrelevant documents and that a “key word” search would readily reveal which items
where relevant to the investigation.259 The court went on to note that if the grand
jury had reason to believe that relevant documents were being withheld, a court
appointed expert could be used to search the computer equipment for relevant
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information.260 The subpoena was quashed in its entirety since it unnecessarily
demanded that irrelevant documents be produced.261
The file cabinet analogy is much more appropriate to a search of computer files
than the closed container analogy that has been predominately followed regarding
search and seizure of computer files. The closed container analogy allows for
unlimited intrusion into the contents of a computer’s storage without a showing of
relevance. Just as police sort through the contents of paper filing cabinets, seizing
only those documents that appear relevant to their investigation, so should they be
required to sort through the storage devices of computers that are the object of
investigation. First, it appears from the case law that courts are simply too willing to
allow wholesale seizure of computers containing intermingled relevant and irrelevant
documents. Second, we must ask why police tend to cart away entire computers
while not taking with them large numbers of filing cabinets? The answer is simple-an entire personal computer is small and weighs only around fifteen pounds and is
easy to take. It is not so simple to cart off the entire contents of ten or fifteen file
cabinets full of paper documents.
The subpoena process, unlike the use of search warrants, requires the government
to make some showing of relevance prior to the production of documents that are
requested. In addition, the person served with a subpoena has the right to challenge
the request prior to production of any of the information. This additional protection
is not available to a citizen served with a search warrant. The Supreme Court noted
that a search warrant is preferable in circumstances where it “is necessary to secure
and to avoid the destruction of evidence.”262 The cases involving subpoenas
involved financial and business related crimes in which destruction of evidence is
not great a danger. First, if the focus of the subpoena is a professional, like the
accountant in Horowitz,263 the person served with the subpoena may not be under
investigation but merely in possession of relevant records. There would be,
therefore, no motivation to destroy evidence to avoid prosecution. Second, if the
crime involves a financial scheme, relevant documents are likely to be found in the
possession of persons other than those suspected of criminal activities. If the crime
involved customers, banks, or other financial institutions, copies of relevant
documents can be obtained from these sources even if the suspect destroys
computerized records in the face of a subpoena. In addition, destruction of
documents relevant to a grand jury subpoena would constitute an additional crime
for which the suspect can be prosecuted.264 Thus, in investigations of more complex
financial transactions, where the possibility of destruction of evidence is not as great,
the subpoena process should be the preferred approach.
VII. CONCLUSION
The Fourth Amendment provides an adequate framework for the protection of
personal privacy interests against unreasonably intrusive searches and seizures of
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computers and computer data. This framework, however, is only adequate if the
courts interpret the contours of the Fourth Amendment in the context of changing
times and circumstances. The advent of the widespread use of computer technology
by large segments of the population to store a variety of information, presents the
legal system with new and interesting challenges.
Several doctrines are apparent from the review of this emerging area of the law.
First, the “plain view” exception to the warrant requirement will not be applied by
the courts to closed files in computer storage. The only way in which a computer
can be seized under the “plain view” doctrine, is in the event that some relevant
evidence of criminality is prominently displayed on the computer screen. These
cases are few in number with most searches aimed at the closed contents of computer
memory. In such cases, the contents of computer storage are considered to carry a
high level of Fourth Amendment protection and require a warrant to examine the
contents of any files.
Second, although informant information can prove useful to the government, any
such information must be used with great care. If the circumstances of the
informant’s actions are directed by or motivated by a desire aid the government, the
informant provided information will not be useable. In addition, in cases where
judging the nature of the content of computer files requires expertise, courts may not
find the conclusions of the informant dispositive or a proper basis to support
probable cause for a warrant. Judging what constitutes child pornography may not
be within the grasp of average citizens. Defendants may be able to successfully
challenge the state’s use of conclusory informant statements.
The reported cases to date indicate that search warrants for computers are
construed broadly and the analogy of the closed container is used by most courts in
establishing the scope of the searches and seizures. This analogy is dangerous. If
viewed as a closed container, a warrant authorizing search of computer memory
provides a virtually unlimited right, on the part of the police, to review the contents
of any files with any sorting as to relevance. Once you have the right to open a
closed container that means that you may look at anything contained therein. This
analogy is too simplistic and allows for search and seizure of computer to proceed in
a very intrusive manner and should be abandoned.
The Ninth Circuit in Tamura265 proposed that computer storage should be
analogized to a filing cabinet. This approach recognizes certain aspects of computer
storage that the closed container analogy ignores. First, a computer hard drive often
contains tens of thousands of files that contain a mixture of personal files, in which
the state does not have a legitimate interest, intermingled with those that may contain
evidence of some crime. Tamura266 suggests that police should be required to
perform on-site sorting of computer data to isolate relevant from irrelevant, and
possibly highly personal, data if at all possible. If on-site sorting is not possible, the
later sorting requires supervision from an independent magistrate and a showing of
the practical considerations that prevented the on-site sorting. In addition, Tamura267
held that if the police feel that wholesale seizure of computer equipment will be
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required, approval for this should be obtained in advance at the time of warrant
application. The courts have, however, been all too willing to accept the
government’s assertions of practical considerations making on-site sorting of data
impossible. The Tamura268 approach is not valuable unless the courts apply its
requirements strictly and consistently the state’s interests and convenience will
continue to be placed above those of personal privacy.
Finally, as an additional protection against invasion of personal privacy, the
subpoena process should be the preferred approach to investigations of computer
based crime if at all possible. Unlike the warrant search the legal process is available
to challenge overly broad subpoenas prior to producing the information. Generally
some minimal showing of relevance is required for subpoena to survive a challenge
as to breadth. Obviously, the subpoena process is only appropriate in certain cases
where the destruction of evidence is not probable. This may be the case in
investigations or complex financial schemes.
In child pornography cases,
destruction of evidence is a real possibility and warrants should be used, but the
warrants should be used in strict compliance with the requirements of Tamura.269
If these suggestions are followed, search and seizure of computers will proceed in
a manner that properly balances the interest of society in prosecuting crime with
those of personal privacy such that the process proceeds in the least intrusive manner
possible. If the courts continue down the road of liberalizing search and seizure in
favor of the convenience of the government, the trend towards erosion of Fourth
Amendment privacy protections will continue. The courts can and should stop this
trend.
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